I'm on the "admin." email list for a volunteer group that organises monthly tech. talks. I'm not the volunteer who orders the pizza, so normally I don't fuss too much over how many registrations have landed. But I recruited this month's speaker, and wanted to give him a rough head-count (especially since it was a higher than usual, which is always good to report).
One downside to flipping through all those EventBrite notifications, however, was the huuuuuuge and depressing preponderance of "anonymous" email accounts used to register for the talk. Clearly, someone--well, pretty much everyone in our almost-big-enough-to-be-statistically-valid sample--has had their workaday email address trammeled by someone before. And (more to the point) that's not news or even remarkable. It's merely evolution in action, really. In the sense that arms races can be considered "evolutionary," anyway.
Until now, I'd failed to see the extra irony in that response. GMail and Hotmail (and the odd Yahoo) accounts are, of course, a prophylactic against having one's attention-stream repeatedly crashed by spammers and scammers. Not unlike how single women will wear fake wedding/engagement rings as a prophylactic against being creeped-on. (Needless to say, its deterrent effect is never 100%, but on balance it's worth the clunky el-cheapo jewelry. Pro tip, ladies: A layer of clear nail polish over the metal of a dime-store ring will extend its lifespan by months. Trust me on this.)
So, in an attempt to preserve the online equivalent of personal space, people choose to trade their privacy and a certain amount of attention-span. Because of course Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo are monetising both. Behind the scenes, naturally. Which apparently makes all the difference. It's difference between the creeper at the pub who won't take "go away" for an answer and the stalker who rifles through your garbage and eavesdrops at your window. But the latter is at least discreet about it--incredibly polite, in fact--and (best of all) you're not its only target. So it's not even personal, which almost makes it not-creepy, hey?
Please understand that I'm actually not slagging Google or Microsoft or Yahoo here. Blocking all the spam and worse spawned in the underbelly of the internet is itself an arms-race. Just handling the sheer amount of illicit email traffic chews up resources that your average I/T department can't afford. Bayesian filters require constant "training" and updates to the code to keep up with the latest scams, viruses, and desperately incompetent marketing hacks. Only huge corporations have the resources to A.) Scale up to the challenges, and B.) Pay for it all with targeted advertising revenue. "Targeted," naturally, implies sniffing email for keywords and (more importantly) patterns and embedding compatible ads in the user experience.
Within the confines of the free market, we're left with an imperfect system. In essence, we're allowing the stalkers to protect us from (most of) the creepers. To imagine any other outcome is reading History backward without remembering that it is lived forward. And also to forget that people people--perhaps as much as the corporate people of which Mitt Romney famously spoke--have zero conscience when it comes to externalising costs for things you can't actually touch. Maybe even negative conscience, given some of the rationalisations I've heard. Internet security, naturally, ranks high on that list. Which is precisely what criminals and griefers are banking on. And, as if we could forget, Marketing's sins are both legion and legendary--regardless of medium.
If it weren't for those inconvenient truths, I'd feel less futile in wishing for a do-over on email at this late date. Namely, a do-over that doesn't require the ghetto-isation of personal email. Because a tool that's so critical to modern life (on the clock and off) doesn't fit well into any of those flows on or off the clock. To say that I'm fussy about my tools (in software development as well as elsewhere) is a massive understatement. You take care of your tools, and they'll take care of you. I believe that.
Predictions of email's demise are over a decade old. (Just like predictions of the demise of many things. Particularly when made by people too busy penning tech. articles to read any Geoffrey Moore.) But let's imagine that the street-corner nut-job with the doomsday sign is correct and that The End is, in fact, Near. That would be our last, best hope for owning up to how much #FAIL is baked into the current system and keeping it out of the Next Big Next Big Thing, yes? Effectively, means that it's time to (finally!) put a price-the on "free" email that reflects all its costs: The internalised costs of our own context-switching as well as externalised costs of subsidising crime, giving viruses a vector for spreading, etc.
When the internet first went mainstream, we were treated to starry-eyed predictions of democratisation and broadened horizons and geysers of previously untapped human potential. To some extent that's happened...along with other things less laudable or savoury. But there's no excuse for not learning the lessons of the past two decades, and far less excuse for perpetuating its sins. I'm at an age where I don't have soaring hopes
for the future--after that whole flying cars and Mars vacations thing
didn't pan out and all. But I'm all-in for "not-creepy internet" Can we get it right next time?
Thoughts on computers, companies, and the equally puzzling humans who interact with them
Showing posts with label InfoSec. Show all posts
Showing posts with label InfoSec. Show all posts
Monday, January 18, 2016
Thursday, May 28, 2015
Full-spectrum security
Yesterday, I stopped into Carey My Keys on St. George Street to have some spares cut. The front door was open to both the patrons and the weather, and the poor dude who was supposed to be staffing the counter was instead juggling two phone calls. While waiting, I took a gander around the place.
Keys are no use without locks, of course, so the range of those on sale was impressive. Ditto the safes. And a few fancy-schmancy electronic devices. Also on display, though not actually for sale, were two dogs, both sprawled out in the warmth of the afternoon. At least when no human attention was forthcoming. (Because, naturally, any Office Dog worthy of the title must be a friend to the world. It's in the union by-laws.)
I couldn't help but appreciate the full range of security options, of which dogs, of course, are by far the oldest. I suppose even Office Cat #1, who growls and hides at the sound of a knock or the doorbell, technically qualifies as security--particularly whenever I'm wearing headphones.
In the purely physical world, each form of security acts as a filter against specific hacks. Locks can be picked. Someone with inside knowledge could find a way to disable a security alarm. Dogs could theoretically be neutralised one way or another--possibly before sounding any form of alarm. But all together, someone would have to be both determined and thorough about breaking into your house to do it successfully. Particularly if you were home at the time.
Online, it should be much the same story, meaning an overlapping of different mechanisms to prevent someone from breaking in. Sure, you can set up your web application to use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 100% of the time, not to mention require password lengths to be measured by the kilometer. But that doesn't stop someone with a bot-net trying to crack it with sheer brute-force computing power. Adding a captcha (those mangled combinations of letters/numbers you have to type) to the login form complicates matters for the bot-net, but in the end, it's just another iteration of the arms-race. But locking out the account (even for a minute) really puts a crimp in a bot's style.
Alas, that doesn't stop someone from setting up an identical-looking website and sending out emails that attempt to trick your users into signing in (a.k.a "phishing"). (And, by the bye, nothing in the above scenario covers direct attacks on your I/T infrastructure. That's a whole 'nuther job, and I'll get to that in a minute.)
As in real life, nothing's ever 100% secure. That being said, the fact that there is no proverbial silver bullet is no excuse for not loading the entire clip.
As a programmer, a ridiculous percentage of the code I write exists to lock out the baddies. A sample (but by no means complete) list of tactics:
In practical terms, anyone thinking of paying programmers to develop a custom application should make security part of the initial discussion*. It's not an after-market feature that you bolt on right before it goes out the door.
More importantly, it's not a feature that one single person should be responsible for. Even when that one single person wears many hats (as I do).
- - - - -
* Pro tip: Talk to your favourite geek ahead of time to develop a few intelligent questions about security alongside other pertinent issues like scalability. Informed questions are an inoculant against being taken lightly.
Story: Before I knew anything about cars, I used to call a friend who fixed them for a living. Then I could walk into the shop and parrot something like, "My gut feeling is that there's a flat spot in the starter, but you might want to take a look at the solenoid, too," and have a reasonably good chance of not being fleeced. Trust me, this is a totally legit. way to approach negotiating with anyone who's a domain expert where you're not. Eventually, though, I found a mechanic I could trust. Which was just as well, because I learned a lot of things about cars--or at least 1983 Toyota Tercels--as its innards were replaced during the remainder of its 16-year lifespan.
Keys are no use without locks, of course, so the range of those on sale was impressive. Ditto the safes. And a few fancy-schmancy electronic devices. Also on display, though not actually for sale, were two dogs, both sprawled out in the warmth of the afternoon. At least when no human attention was forthcoming. (Because, naturally, any Office Dog worthy of the title must be a friend to the world. It's in the union by-laws.)
I couldn't help but appreciate the full range of security options, of which dogs, of course, are by far the oldest. I suppose even Office Cat #1, who growls and hides at the sound of a knock or the doorbell, technically qualifies as security--particularly whenever I'm wearing headphones.
In the purely physical world, each form of security acts as a filter against specific hacks. Locks can be picked. Someone with inside knowledge could find a way to disable a security alarm. Dogs could theoretically be neutralised one way or another--possibly before sounding any form of alarm. But all together, someone would have to be both determined and thorough about breaking into your house to do it successfully. Particularly if you were home at the time.
Online, it should be much the same story, meaning an overlapping of different mechanisms to prevent someone from breaking in. Sure, you can set up your web application to use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 100% of the time, not to mention require password lengths to be measured by the kilometer. But that doesn't stop someone with a bot-net trying to crack it with sheer brute-force computing power. Adding a captcha (those mangled combinations of letters/numbers you have to type) to the login form complicates matters for the bot-net, but in the end, it's just another iteration of the arms-race. But locking out the account (even for a minute) really puts a crimp in a bot's style.
Alas, that doesn't stop someone from setting up an identical-looking website and sending out emails that attempt to trick your users into signing in (a.k.a "phishing"). (And, by the bye, nothing in the above scenario covers direct attacks on your I/T infrastructure. That's a whole 'nuther job, and I'll get to that in a minute.)
As in real life, nothing's ever 100% secure. That being said, the fact that there is no proverbial silver bullet is no excuse for not loading the entire clip.
As a programmer, a ridiculous percentage of the code I write exists to lock out the baddies. A sample (but by no means complete) list of tactics:
- Verifying all input sent by the browser to the server, and back and forth between the server and the database.
- Scrubbing potentially malicious characters out of text entered by the user (e.g. attempted SQL injection or JavaScript injection attacks).
- Encrypting important data (e.g. passwords and email addresses) so that even if the database were compromised, those would be useless to the thief.
- Preventing specific error messages from the server (and, most especially the database) from being displayed back to the web browser.
- Encapsulating code data access functionality in database functions, which adds another level of validation/protection.
- When appropriate, using industry-standard frameworks.
- Not keeping the system patched with security updates.
- Not shutting off unnecessary processes--particularly those which can reach (or be reached from) outside the network.
- Not limiting the channels (a.k.a. ports) on which traffic can flow to and from the server.
- Not using strong passwords.
- Not locking down resources (e.g. files and databases) to restrict which users can access them...and limit those to the bare minimum.
- Not using/enforcing SSL certificates (or using self-signed ones).
- Not having intrusion detection in place, or having no mechanism to defend against denial-of-service attacks.
In practical terms, anyone thinking of paying programmers to develop a custom application should make security part of the initial discussion*. It's not an after-market feature that you bolt on right before it goes out the door.
More importantly, it's not a feature that one single person should be responsible for. Even when that one single person wears many hats (as I do).
- - - - -
* Pro tip: Talk to your favourite geek ahead of time to develop a few intelligent questions about security alongside other pertinent issues like scalability. Informed questions are an inoculant against being taken lightly.
Story: Before I knew anything about cars, I used to call a friend who fixed them for a living. Then I could walk into the shop and parrot something like, "My gut feeling is that there's a flat spot in the starter, but you might want to take a look at the solenoid, too," and have a reasonably good chance of not being fleeced. Trust me, this is a totally legit. way to approach negotiating with anyone who's a domain expert where you're not. Eventually, though, I found a mechanic I could trust. Which was just as well, because I learned a lot of things about cars--or at least 1983 Toyota Tercels--as its innards were replaced during the remainder of its 16-year lifespan.
Monday, April 20, 2015
Of hacking and hysteria
For your faithful blogger, Programmer School was a small community college with only two full-time I/T instructors--let's call them "M" and "N." "M" was better geared to teaching actual coding, while "N" mostly concentrated on application-based courses, and was a bang-up administrator for the dept. We were a tight-knit enough tribe that "N" thought nothing of mentioning that "M"'s birthday was the next day.
I happened to have the first class period of the day with "M" that semester. And, by good fortune, the janitorial folks knew us all--particularly the 2nd year students--well enough to trust us after hours in the classrooms/labs. I knew from observation that "M"'s morning routine was to turn on the projector and instructor's computer, then meander back to his office or chat with students during boot-up. It was the perfect opportunity to pounce.
This was also the era of Windows 95, which didn't support multiple logins. And honestly, the projector-connected instructor's computer at the head of the class didn't have much use for security--anything important like grades would have been on "M"'s office computer.
After hours, I used MS-Paint to make a colourful .BMP file bearing a "Happy Birthday" message and set that as the Windows background image on the instructor's computer. Then I ran down the Beatles' "Happy Birthday" and set the Windows start-up sound to a clip from it. Finally, I powered down and made sure all the other computers in the lab were off (part of our implicit bargain with the cleaning folks) and went home.
The prank worked perfectly. True to form, "M" hit the "on" button and strolled back through the classroom. A collective chuckle at the sight of the desktop background rippled through the classroom. And just as "M" turned back to look at the screen, sound clip made everyone (else) jump a bit. The grin and eye-roll were exactly the payoff I was hoping for.
It's one of my fonder memories of Programmer School. Yet, if this had gone down in Florida instead of Minnesota, pranking "M" could be considered a felony. Why? Because I used a computer to which I was not authorised.
In Florida, a 14 year-old is facing felony charges for changing the desktop background of his teacher's computer. Just like I did to "M" nearly 20 years ago.
It might be tempting to make the argument that, because my background image was amusing rather than potentially offensive, it's not illegal. That argument would be wrongity-wrong-wrong. Because, as the Sheriff's Dept. stresses, it's not about what the student actually did. Or even what he provably had intentions of doing. No, no, no--it's about what he might have done under the lax security conditions.
And that, Gentle Reader--that is one dangerous precedent right there. Like, irradiated city-stomping B-movie monster dangerous.
Cynically, I understand that piling on every possible charge basically amounts to a sandbagging tactic when law enforcement tries to finagle a guilty plea from the suspect. That doesn't make it smart, much less right. Law enforcement in the U.S. already has a huuuuuge PR problem, and this certainly doesn't help.
More significantly, criminalising woefully uninformed, hysterical notions of "hacking" doesn't improve infosec. All it does is shifts responsibility away from companies that should be enforcing strong passwords, multi-factor authentication, and, well, not hiring the kind of moron who clicks URLs in dodgy emails in the first place.
But it's we who should be worried far more. There's a reason that breaking and entering is a separate crime from actual theft (or any other malfeasance one can wreak in another house). Opportunity does not constitute intent.
And we in the I/T community need to step up and hold politicians accountable for perpetuating decades of ignorant, alarmist, knee-jerk legislation/regulation. Seriously, even Hollywood has a better grasp of computers and networking--and that's not exactly pegging the bar high, y'all.
I happened to have the first class period of the day with "M" that semester. And, by good fortune, the janitorial folks knew us all--particularly the 2nd year students--well enough to trust us after hours in the classrooms/labs. I knew from observation that "M"'s morning routine was to turn on the projector and instructor's computer, then meander back to his office or chat with students during boot-up. It was the perfect opportunity to pounce.
This was also the era of Windows 95, which didn't support multiple logins. And honestly, the projector-connected instructor's computer at the head of the class didn't have much use for security--anything important like grades would have been on "M"'s office computer.
After hours, I used MS-Paint to make a colourful .BMP file bearing a "Happy Birthday" message and set that as the Windows background image on the instructor's computer. Then I ran down the Beatles' "Happy Birthday" and set the Windows start-up sound to a clip from it. Finally, I powered down and made sure all the other computers in the lab were off (part of our implicit bargain with the cleaning folks) and went home.
The prank worked perfectly. True to form, "M" hit the "on" button and strolled back through the classroom. A collective chuckle at the sight of the desktop background rippled through the classroom. And just as "M" turned back to look at the screen, sound clip made everyone (else) jump a bit. The grin and eye-roll were exactly the payoff I was hoping for.
It's one of my fonder memories of Programmer School. Yet, if this had gone down in Florida instead of Minnesota, pranking "M" could be considered a felony. Why? Because I used a computer to which I was not authorised.
In Florida, a 14 year-old is facing felony charges for changing the desktop background of his teacher's computer. Just like I did to "M" nearly 20 years ago.
It might be tempting to make the argument that, because my background image was amusing rather than potentially offensive, it's not illegal. That argument would be wrongity-wrong-wrong. Because, as the Sheriff's Dept. stresses, it's not about what the student actually did. Or even what he provably had intentions of doing. No, no, no--it's about what he might have done under the lax security conditions.
And that, Gentle Reader--that is one dangerous precedent right there. Like, irradiated city-stomping B-movie monster dangerous.
Cynically, I understand that piling on every possible charge basically amounts to a sandbagging tactic when law enforcement tries to finagle a guilty plea from the suspect. That doesn't make it smart, much less right. Law enforcement in the U.S. already has a huuuuuge PR problem, and this certainly doesn't help.
More significantly, criminalising woefully uninformed, hysterical notions of "hacking" doesn't improve infosec. All it does is shifts responsibility away from companies that should be enforcing strong passwords, multi-factor authentication, and, well, not hiring the kind of moron who clicks URLs in dodgy emails in the first place.
But it's we who should be worried far more. There's a reason that breaking and entering is a separate crime from actual theft (or any other malfeasance one can wreak in another house). Opportunity does not constitute intent.
And we in the I/T community need to step up and hold politicians accountable for perpetuating decades of ignorant, alarmist, knee-jerk legislation/regulation. Seriously, even Hollywood has a better grasp of computers and networking--and that's not exactly pegging the bar high, y'all.
Monday, March 9, 2015
Another cost of commoditisation
Twenty years ago, when internet usage started up steep slope of its hockey-stick growth in adoption rates, web programming was much "closer to the metal" than it is today. I'm certainly not advocating for a return to those days. (For one thing, FTP via command-line is tedious unless you're a preternaturally fast and accurate typist--and I'm certainly not.)
Nor do I think that it's a loss to my trade that content management systems such as WordPress, Joomla or Drupal have taken a lot of grunt-work out of setting up a website. They've certainly given people less of an excuse for not updating their website content, too, which is all to the good. I'd muuuuch rather be working on business logic or databases than jerking pixels around on a screen. More power to them who can do it without their brains leaking out their ears.
Plus, I've hand-coded a blog in HTML before. Booooooorrring.... So I'm glad that Blogspot--and to a lesser degree the messier Tumblr--have made formatting a highlight-and-click operation.
It's great that the tools have become slick enough that someone with little to no programming/database knowledge could click an icon, step through a wizard, and have their own customised website. And, if they're willing to put up with a certain amount of jankiness, they can hook it into a shopping cart and payment processing for an online store. Sweet.
But the increasing sophistication of the tools and platforms for putting words and images on the internet are making my life difficult in one respect. Namely, that when I do need to open up the "black box" to (figuratively) poke and prod, I'm seeing less and less ability to do that. At least with shared hosting, which is the cheapest (and thus most commoditised) way you can rent web server space from someone.
But as such tools/have lost their rough edges and hidden the complexities and underpinnings of the system, the server "landlords" have--in my experience--been removing access to those underpinnings. Sometimes in ways that make absolutely zero (if not, in fact, negative) sense. For instance, I'm finding it difficult to fine-tune access to my databases because the tools are incomplete...when they're not completely unavailable. Without being too technical, that's a Big Deal(TM) for me because it impacts overall web application security. When you make it difficult for me to protect my clients' data to the best of my ability, we have a problem.
In other words, the lid of the "black box" has been nailed down.
Worse, trying to make the support techs understand that is wasting more of my time than I can afford to spend lately. Which tells me that I'm dealing with people who are more used to fiddling with the dashboard than going under the hood. That's disconcerting.
I'm all for making the toolset more ergonomic, even (maybe especially) in the cognitive sense. But that doesn't require taking away powerful, if somewhat more arcane tools. Even in the name of saving screen space. In fact, hiding the latter toolset behind an "Ugly Tools" header would pretty much encourage anyone who doesn't, say, know how to write a stored procedure to back out after the first curious peek.
I realise that it can often be negligible, but there is a difference between mainstreaming technology and dumbing it down. The current state of things (at least as I've experienced them in the last year or so) has definitely crossed that line.
Then again, I live in a world where people are willing to pay top dollar for a slick interface to a walled garden--or should I say Apple orchard. Which is precisely the problem. I won't buy an iPhone on principle. Yet there are any number of alternatives that don't think I'm too incompetent/precious to, say, add more memory, change the battery, side-load apps., etc.
But when commoditisation of the web hosting market not only limits my choice, but interferes with my due diligence as a web developer? That just makes me crabby. Look, I'm glad that we've can scale solutions to problems mostly likely to befall the fat head (not a pejorative term) of the long tail. But some of us are out there tackling problems for the niches who may someday become mainstream. Don't make our work any more challenging, alright? #grumble
Nor do I think that it's a loss to my trade that content management systems such as WordPress, Joomla or Drupal have taken a lot of grunt-work out of setting up a website. They've certainly given people less of an excuse for not updating their website content, too, which is all to the good. I'd muuuuch rather be working on business logic or databases than jerking pixels around on a screen. More power to them who can do it without their brains leaking out their ears.
Plus, I've hand-coded a blog in HTML before. Booooooorrring.... So I'm glad that Blogspot--and to a lesser degree the messier Tumblr--have made formatting a highlight-and-click operation.
It's great that the tools have become slick enough that someone with little to no programming/database knowledge could click an icon, step through a wizard, and have their own customised website. And, if they're willing to put up with a certain amount of jankiness, they can hook it into a shopping cart and payment processing for an online store. Sweet.
But the increasing sophistication of the tools and platforms for putting words and images on the internet are making my life difficult in one respect. Namely, that when I do need to open up the "black box" to (figuratively) poke and prod, I'm seeing less and less ability to do that. At least with shared hosting, which is the cheapest (and thus most commoditised) way you can rent web server space from someone.
But as such tools/have lost their rough edges and hidden the complexities and underpinnings of the system, the server "landlords" have--in my experience--been removing access to those underpinnings. Sometimes in ways that make absolutely zero (if not, in fact, negative) sense. For instance, I'm finding it difficult to fine-tune access to my databases because the tools are incomplete...when they're not completely unavailable. Without being too technical, that's a Big Deal(TM) for me because it impacts overall web application security. When you make it difficult for me to protect my clients' data to the best of my ability, we have a problem.
In other words, the lid of the "black box" has been nailed down.
Worse, trying to make the support techs understand that is wasting more of my time than I can afford to spend lately. Which tells me that I'm dealing with people who are more used to fiddling with the dashboard than going under the hood. That's disconcerting.
I'm all for making the toolset more ergonomic, even (maybe especially) in the cognitive sense. But that doesn't require taking away powerful, if somewhat more arcane tools. Even in the name of saving screen space. In fact, hiding the latter toolset behind an "Ugly Tools" header would pretty much encourage anyone who doesn't, say, know how to write a stored procedure to back out after the first curious peek.
I realise that it can often be negligible, but there is a difference between mainstreaming technology and dumbing it down. The current state of things (at least as I've experienced them in the last year or so) has definitely crossed that line.
Then again, I live in a world where people are willing to pay top dollar for a slick interface to a walled garden--or should I say Apple orchard. Which is precisely the problem. I won't buy an iPhone on principle. Yet there are any number of alternatives that don't think I'm too incompetent/precious to, say, add more memory, change the battery, side-load apps., etc.
But when commoditisation of the web hosting market not only limits my choice, but interferes with my due diligence as a web developer? That just makes me crabby. Look, I'm glad that we've can scale solutions to problems mostly likely to befall the fat head (not a pejorative term) of the long tail. But some of us are out there tackling problems for the niches who may someday become mainstream. Don't make our work any more challenging, alright? #grumble
Wednesday, January 7, 2015
Third dimension of debugging
It's pretty much become an I/T cliché that software peeps blame the hardware, and hardware peeps blame software for any particularly nasty gremlins.
The phenomenon dates, more or less, from the PC boom of the 1980s and 1990s. Not only were there more players in the hardware market, but the standards were somewhat more in flux. (Anyone foolish enough to whine about accidentally buying a mini-USB cable to charge their micro-USB phone within the earshot of any SysAdmin of a certain age can--and should--expect be summarily wedgied.)
The standards issues leaked into the software development as well. For instance: Even during my late-90s stint in Programmer School, I remember losing points on a test because I assumed the number of bytes in the data types were based on Borland's C-language compiler rather than Microsoft's. (If that seemed like gibberish to you, don't sweat it; just trust me when I say that it was kind of a big deal Back In The Day(TM).)
Then along came the (commercial) internet. And then broadband internet. Which, in addition to opening unparalleled opportunities for data exchange, opened unparalleled avenues for data theft, denial-of-service attacks, and the digital equivalent of graffiti. Thus did using a PC on a network lose its dewy-eyed innocence.
Enter the firewall. In laypersons' terms, it's a device that can be configured to allow or deny network traffic based on where it's coming from or destined for, and also what channels (a.k.a. "ports") it's using. (Firewalls--most famously Windows Firewall--can be software-only and designed to protect a single computer, but that's another story for another time.)
As an analogy, think of an airport operating when zombies have taken over another part of the world. Flights originating from entire continents might be turned away altogether. Flights originating from "authorised" locations might be allowed to land, but are still restricted to certain gates. Similarly, planes might not be allowed to fly to questionable destinations, or are only allowed to use certain terminals or runways. Any overrides/exceptions to those rules, of course, are potential weak points in the system that heighten the risk of zombies taking over the entire world.
Then, too, security for groups of networked computers inside the same network has evolved, mainly to minimise the damage a rogue operator can do. Folders and whole file systems, servers, databases, what-have-you can require separate passwords, or only allow you to do certain things (such as read but not update). This is analogous to how airports are segmented into terminals, have restricted areas, etc. It even, to some extent, mimics the redundancies in security one experiences with a connecting flight on an international trip. Usually, that's a more seamless process than the idiocies of post-9/11 Security Theatre.
Usually.
This week has not been one of those times. Thus do I find myself doing the legwork for a junior support tech at a shared hosting provider's Help Desk. (Grrrrrr.) And realising anew how much more I'm going to have to stay on top of the networking & security aspects of maintaining a server than I have in years past. It's not so much that networking/security technology has taken a quantum leap and I'm playing catch-up. No, it's mainly a human issue. To wit: When I can no longer trust the word of the wizards behind the consoles, it adds another dimension to debugging. Debugging, I might add, that sometimes has to be done under fire in production.
These days (responsive web design and the usual Android/iOS tug-o-war excepted), hardware ranks relatively low on the list of usual suspects when a gremlin pops up. Network and database permissions, on the other hand, have shot up that list to a near-permanent slot in second place. Suspect #1, naturally, is always my own code. But when I haven't touched said code since early Dec., and scheduled jobs suddenly stop working around New Year's Eve (holidays being a favourite time for techs. to sneak in updates)? Ding!Ding!Ding!Ding!Ding!Ding! Ladies and gentlemen, I believe we have a new winner.
All of which sounds like whining on my part, and I'm really not. (Pinky-swear!) I'm merely hoping that this facet of a custom software developer's trade helps to explain why it's not a trivial activity. And why we don't do for free. (Note: Code written to scratch our own itches before we let other people make copies of it is not the same thing as "free.") And why we don't appreciate hearing, "This should be easy for you." And also why we are so darned insistent that our clients actually try apps. out for themselves before turning them loose on the world. Because "It works on my network" is the new version of the dreaded "It works on my machine."
The phenomenon dates, more or less, from the PC boom of the 1980s and 1990s. Not only were there more players in the hardware market, but the standards were somewhat more in flux. (Anyone foolish enough to whine about accidentally buying a mini-USB cable to charge their micro-USB phone within the earshot of any SysAdmin of a certain age can--and should--expect be summarily wedgied.)
The standards issues leaked into the software development as well. For instance: Even during my late-90s stint in Programmer School, I remember losing points on a test because I assumed the number of bytes in the data types were based on Borland's C-language compiler rather than Microsoft's. (If that seemed like gibberish to you, don't sweat it; just trust me when I say that it was kind of a big deal Back In The Day(TM).)
Then along came the (commercial) internet. And then broadband internet. Which, in addition to opening unparalleled opportunities for data exchange, opened unparalleled avenues for data theft, denial-of-service attacks, and the digital equivalent of graffiti. Thus did using a PC on a network lose its dewy-eyed innocence.
Enter the firewall. In laypersons' terms, it's a device that can be configured to allow or deny network traffic based on where it's coming from or destined for, and also what channels (a.k.a. "ports") it's using. (Firewalls--most famously Windows Firewall--can be software-only and designed to protect a single computer, but that's another story for another time.)
As an analogy, think of an airport operating when zombies have taken over another part of the world. Flights originating from entire continents might be turned away altogether. Flights originating from "authorised" locations might be allowed to land, but are still restricted to certain gates. Similarly, planes might not be allowed to fly to questionable destinations, or are only allowed to use certain terminals or runways. Any overrides/exceptions to those rules, of course, are potential weak points in the system that heighten the risk of zombies taking over the entire world.
Then, too, security for groups of networked computers inside the same network has evolved, mainly to minimise the damage a rogue operator can do. Folders and whole file systems, servers, databases, what-have-you can require separate passwords, or only allow you to do certain things (such as read but not update). This is analogous to how airports are segmented into terminals, have restricted areas, etc. It even, to some extent, mimics the redundancies in security one experiences with a connecting flight on an international trip. Usually, that's a more seamless process than the idiocies of post-9/11 Security Theatre.
Usually.
This week has not been one of those times. Thus do I find myself doing the legwork for a junior support tech at a shared hosting provider's Help Desk. (Grrrrrr.) And realising anew how much more I'm going to have to stay on top of the networking & security aspects of maintaining a server than I have in years past. It's not so much that networking/security technology has taken a quantum leap and I'm playing catch-up. No, it's mainly a human issue. To wit: When I can no longer trust the word of the wizards behind the consoles, it adds another dimension to debugging. Debugging, I might add, that sometimes has to be done under fire in production.
These days (responsive web design and the usual Android/iOS tug-o-war excepted), hardware ranks relatively low on the list of usual suspects when a gremlin pops up. Network and database permissions, on the other hand, have shot up that list to a near-permanent slot in second place. Suspect #1, naturally, is always my own code. But when I haven't touched said code since early Dec., and scheduled jobs suddenly stop working around New Year's Eve (holidays being a favourite time for techs. to sneak in updates)? Ding!Ding!Ding!Ding!Ding!Ding! Ladies and gentlemen, I believe we have a new winner.
All of which sounds like whining on my part, and I'm really not. (Pinky-swear!) I'm merely hoping that this facet of a custom software developer's trade helps to explain why it's not a trivial activity. And why we don't do for free. (Note: Code written to scratch our own itches before we let other people make copies of it is not the same thing as "free.") And why we don't appreciate hearing, "This should be easy for you." And also why we are so darned insistent that our clients actually try apps. out for themselves before turning them loose on the world. Because "It works on my network" is the new version of the dreaded "It works on my machine."
Wednesday, December 3, 2014
Digital rubbernecking
As a programmer, I write a fair amount of code that is paranoid--specifically, of anything coming in from the Web. There is also the added overhead of dealing with encrypted data--passwords, email addresses and the like. The rest I more or less leave to the folks who set up the servers on which my code and data lives. Ditto the folks who set up the routers and networks and who invent/improve the encryption algorithms.
That's not to say that I'm not fascinated by issues around security and cryptology. It's just that I know that I have no aptitude for it--particularly what you'd call "thinking like a hacker." And hacking-post mortems are like candy for me.
Which, in the wake of last week's Sony mega-hack, basically makes me a rubbernecker. (In my defence, I don't rubberneck in real life; gawping at disasters online doesn't slow down the traffic or hinder first responders.)
Oh, and is this ever a train-wreck. Partly, it's the sheer scope. Thirty-eight million files stolen--some of those files whole databases.
Also, though, there was the initial blank-wall response, and now the possibility of fingering the wrong wrongdoer. North Korea was the prime suspect from the get-go. That assessment has been disputed and even criticised by the infosec. community, but that's Sony's story and they're sticking to it. You have to admit, being targeted by a rogue government makes for better security theatre than falling victim to an inside job carried out by pissed-off plebeians.
Oh, and passwords weren't encrypted and the hackers managed to nab SSL root certificates that won't expire for years? #headdesk
It's impossible not to look, right? There are just so many flavours of "screwed" involved here--for the short-, medium-, and long-term:
If it sounds like I'm blaming the victim, I am--but only sorta-kinda. Yes, it's tempting to see this as karma for a company that had no problem infecting paying customers with malware--basically using them as conscripts in their battle against piracy--thus leaving them open to other hackers. And, honestly, Sony's response when the news broke might just be the douchiest thing you'll read all day...assuming you're not following Timothy Loehmann / Daniel Pantaleo apologists on Twitter, of course:
Obviously, I don't work for or at the company, so please don't think I'm speaking with any evidence-based authority here. But the circumstantial evidence points to a management mindset in which security was viewed as an expense to be minimised, rather than an asset to be built and leveraged as a competitive advantage.
If true, investors and other stakeholders should take that cavalier attitude--toward their own crown jewels as well as the personal data of others--as a sign-post on the road to extinction.
Because ultimately, Sony lives in a fully digital world. Movies no longer exist as spools of celluloid. Except for audiophiles, 21st century music is not served up on fragile black vinyl platters. Most games do not play out with wooden/plastic/metal markers on cardboard these days. The upside of that world is that copies of intellectual property can be made for mere fractions of pennies. The downside of that world is that copies can be made for mere fractions of pennies.
Playwright GB Shaw claimed that because the "reasonable man" adapts himself to his environment while the "unreasonable man" adapts his environment to suit himself, all progress must therefore be driven by the unreasonable man. But that assumes two finite ends of a continuum--a continuum that ignores the possibility of unreasonability shading into delusion.
Further back in time, the earliest tragedy tracked the ruin of the great, often precipitated by the hubris with which they met forces or events beyond their control. You'd think that an entertainment company would take that wisdom to heart. The warnings of Euripides and Sophocles ring true even today. But companies like Sony bear no resemblance to the travelling companies of players in centuries past. They're little more than accounting machines, slicing revenues into royalties and residuals.
But you're smart enough to actually listen to your security folks, am I right, Gentle Reader? Please tell me I'm right. Because as much as I do enjoy a good hacking post-mortem (in the same way some people enjoy a good murder mystery), I'd really rather not be rubbernecking at the hacking of someone I know. Thanks.
That's not to say that I'm not fascinated by issues around security and cryptology. It's just that I know that I have no aptitude for it--particularly what you'd call "thinking like a hacker." And hacking-post mortems are like candy for me.
Which, in the wake of last week's Sony mega-hack, basically makes me a rubbernecker. (In my defence, I don't rubberneck in real life; gawping at disasters online doesn't slow down the traffic or hinder first responders.)
Oh, and is this ever a train-wreck. Partly, it's the sheer scope. Thirty-eight million files stolen--some of those files whole databases.
- Movies leaked to torrent sites before their release date
- Scripts for movies not even in production yet
- Source code--presumably for games
- Legal assets like contracts, non-disclosure agreements, etc.
- Salaries, including highly embarrassing discrepancies in executive level pay
- Human resources data, including social security numbers, addresses, birthdays, phone numbers, etc.
- Sales and financial data going back years.
- I/T infrastructure maps, complete with security credentials
Also, though, there was the initial blank-wall response, and now the possibility of fingering the wrong wrongdoer. North Korea was the prime suspect from the get-go. That assessment has been disputed and even criticised by the infosec. community, but that's Sony's story and they're sticking to it. You have to admit, being targeted by a rogue government makes for better security theatre than falling victim to an inside job carried out by pissed-off plebeians.
Oh, and passwords weren't encrypted and the hackers managed to nab SSL root certificates that won't expire for years? #headdesk
It's impossible not to look, right? There are just so many flavours of "screwed" involved here--for the short-, medium-, and long-term:
- Revenue lost to piracy
- Further revenue loss if said pirated content sucks and no one wants to pay to see it
- A pretty-much-unquantifiable loss in competitive advantage to its competitors in the entertainment and gaming industries
- Equipment and staffing costs for scanning, then scrubbing or replacing every single computer currently on possibly touched the network
- Nothing short of an identity theft nightmare for thousands of employees and contractors: Sony footing the bill for any reasonable amount of credit-monitoring and remediation will easily run into the millions of dollars
- The productivity-killing morale-buster for employees now freaking about their current job or their future credit rating
- Possible (probable?) massive class-action lawsuits, particularly if North Korea doesn't turn out to be the villain after all
- The inevitable stock price bobbles, particularly as the after-shocks play out
If it sounds like I'm blaming the victim, I am--but only sorta-kinda. Yes, it's tempting to see this as karma for a company that had no problem infecting paying customers with malware--basically using them as conscripts in their battle against piracy--thus leaving them open to other hackers. And, honestly, Sony's response when the news broke might just be the douchiest thing you'll read all day...assuming you're not following Timothy Loehmann / Daniel Pantaleo apologists on Twitter, of course:
NPR was one of the first to report on the scandal on November 4, 2005. Thomas Hesse, Sony BMG's Global Digital Business President, told reporter Neda Ulaby, "Most people, I think, don't even know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about it?"
Obviously, I don't work for or at the company, so please don't think I'm speaking with any evidence-based authority here. But the circumstantial evidence points to a management mindset in which security was viewed as an expense to be minimised, rather than an asset to be built and leveraged as a competitive advantage.
If true, investors and other stakeholders should take that cavalier attitude--toward their own crown jewels as well as the personal data of others--as a sign-post on the road to extinction.
Because ultimately, Sony lives in a fully digital world. Movies no longer exist as spools of celluloid. Except for audiophiles, 21st century music is not served up on fragile black vinyl platters. Most games do not play out with wooden/plastic/metal markers on cardboard these days. The upside of that world is that copies of intellectual property can be made for mere fractions of pennies. The downside of that world is that copies can be made for mere fractions of pennies.
Playwright GB Shaw claimed that because the "reasonable man" adapts himself to his environment while the "unreasonable man" adapts his environment to suit himself, all progress must therefore be driven by the unreasonable man. But that assumes two finite ends of a continuum--a continuum that ignores the possibility of unreasonability shading into delusion.
Further back in time, the earliest tragedy tracked the ruin of the great, often precipitated by the hubris with which they met forces or events beyond their control. You'd think that an entertainment company would take that wisdom to heart. The warnings of Euripides and Sophocles ring true even today. But companies like Sony bear no resemblance to the travelling companies of players in centuries past. They're little more than accounting machines, slicing revenues into royalties and residuals.
But you're smart enough to actually listen to your security folks, am I right, Gentle Reader? Please tell me I'm right. Because as much as I do enjoy a good hacking post-mortem (in the same way some people enjoy a good murder mystery), I'd really rather not be rubbernecking at the hacking of someone I know. Thanks.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)